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Abstract
We evaluate the effects of different marketing and distribution techniques on the purchase of LongLasting Insecticide-Treated Nets (LL-ITN). Using a randomized controlled trial in urban Senegal,
we look at the impacts of receiving information on malaria-related issues and of different sale
treatments. We find that overall information has no significant effect on the demand for LL-ITNs,
but has a significant effect on individuals who have never attended school and have poor knowledge
of malaria. Receiving an offer to purchase an LL-ITN with a voucher valid for 7 days increases
purchases by 23 percentage points, compared to an on-the-spot sale offer.
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Highlights




We evaluate the effects of different marketing and distribution techniques on the effective
purchase of Long-Lasting Insecticide-Treated Nets (LL-ITN)
We find that overall information has no significant effect on the demand for LL-ITNs, but
has a significant effect on individuals who have never attended school, have poor knowledge
of malaria and did not own any bednet at the baseline
We find that receiving a 7-day voucher significantly increases purchases by 23 percentage
points, compared to an on-the-spot sale offer
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Introduction
The use of Long-Lasting Insecticide-Treated Nets (LL-ITNs) has been shown to have a crucial
impact in reducing the incidence of malaria and mortality of vulnerable groups such as children and
pregnant women (Lengler, 2004). As such LL-ITNs is considered the most important malaria
control tool by the Roll Back Malaria Partnership. Compared to just 3% in 2004, almost half of the
at-risk population in Africa (49%) had access to an LL-ITN in 2013 (WHO, 2014). Because the use
of ITNs has important spillover effects through the reduction of the mosquito population (Gimnig et
al., 2003), there is an important opportunity for universal coverage. A malaria-free environment has
positive effects on, for example, economic growth, development, school attainment and literacy
(Gallup and Sachs, 2001; Bhattacharyya, 2009; Lucas, 2010; Barofsky et al., 2015). However, the
target of universal access is far from being achieved and the level of use of such preventive tools
remains low in countries with endemic malaria.1 As pointed out by household surveys, the vast
majority of people who have an ITN do actually use it (WHO, 2014), particularly during those
seasons where the probability of infection is highest. The crucial issue seems therefore effective
access to, availability of and demand for bednets.

An ongoing debate amongst health researchers and program directors regarding LL-ITN
distribution frameworks considers whether it is it preferable to propose free distribution or to opt for
some form of cost-sharing sharing (see Sexton, 2011, for a review). This issue has notably been
addressed by Cohen and Dupas (2010) in a randomized experiment on pregnant women in Kenya
where it is found that the demand for ITNs is highly price sensitive and cost-sharing is not more
cost-effective, in terms of child mortality, than free distribution. However, this is not the focus of
our analysis. Our study constitutes an attempt to empirically evaluate the effects of different
marketing and distribution techniques on the effective purchase of LL-ITN in a context where they
are sold at a constant subsidized price to the general population.

Different countries have adopted various policies to promote LL-ITN coverage. These include free
distribution to targeted populations (via, for example, antenatal clinics), both free and cost-sharing
distribution during mass campaigns and selling LL-ITNs at a subsidized price at various specialized
places such as pharmacies. 14 countries in Africa sell LL-ITNs at a subsidized price (WHO, 2014).
In our area of interest, Thies in Senegal, the last distribution campaign of LL-ITNs was organized in
2009 and was characterized by cost-sharing. The campaign involved a door-to-door strategy to
deliver a voucher for a subsidized LL-ITN, redeemable at a specific distribution point (health
1
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facility). Since 2009, general access to LL-ITNs has been available in private-run pharmacies at
higher prices (around USD10) compared to the subsidized ones (USD3-6). By 2011, only 53% of
the Senegalese population had access to an LL-ITN [2]. Given this relatively low figure, our paper
attempts to see whether, in addition to having the LL-ITNs available at a fixed point, an on-the-spot
door-to-door sale would improve take-up. The interest in comparing these two strategies lies with
the different economic incentives and constraints faced by households. An on-the-spot door-to-door
sale could be successful under the assumption that people are not cash constrained, but that they
might have limited attention (‘scarcity of attention’) to the necessity of buying a bednet. Drawing
their attention to such a need brings it to the ‘top of mind’ (Shah et al., 2012; Datta and
Mullainathan, 2014). Conversely, a household aware of the need to buy an LL-ITN may face cash
constraints. In this case, a voucher allowing some flexibility over the purchase date of the net could
relax these constraints and increase the incentive to buy. Our study is the first to shed light on the
relative effectiveness of different distribution strategies and to investigate the underlying
mechanisms.

We thus offered subsidized LL-ITNs, at a price similar to the one set during the last national
distribution campaign, for a limited period of time. The offer was addressed to the general
population with no particular target in mind (i.e. not just vulnerable groups such as pregnant women
or children). The study uses two treatments. For the first, we quantitatively measure the impact of
the distribution strategy on effective LL-ITN take-up. This treatment has two arms: first, we
distribute door-to-door vouchers for the purchase of an LL-ITN, redeemable at a specific gathering
points for seven days. This treatment arm mimics the government distribution campaign. Second
through a door-to-door campaign we propose, at the same price as that of the voucher, an on-thespot purchase of an LL-ITN. By comparing the effect of these two arms, we can assess if a larger
uptake could be achieved by selling on-the-spot or with a redeemable voucher.

The second treatment is related to information and assesses the role of knowledge of malaria and its
prevention on the effective purchase of LL-ITNs. We explore the effects of the two treatments
(distribution and information) through a randomized field experiment. Studying the demand for
subsidized bednets on the overall population is relevant if we consider that people buying bednets at
subsidized prices are likely to buy other bednets in the future, at even higher prices (Dupas, 2014).
We are able to estimate the heterogeneous effects our treatments had on relevant household
characteristics at the baseline. In particular, we investigate: 1) the effectiveness of the voucher for
different levels of income; 2) the effect of the information session at different levels of education
4

and different levels of prior knowledge on malaria; 3) whether households with particularly
vulnerable members (pregnant women or children under the age of five) are more susceptible of
purchasing a LL-ITN following our two treatments and 4) if households who do not own a LL-ITN
are more likely to react to our treatments. Our study focuses only on uptake, as we do not observe
actual use of the LL-ITN once purchased.

The Senegalese context
Malaria is an endemic disease throughout Senegal, with the entire population considered at risk.
However, due to public intervention, significant improvements have been seen in the last 10 years.
The share of outpatient visits resulting from malaria fell from 36% (clinically diagnosed and
parasitological tested) in 2001 to 6% in 2008. About 7% of all deaths in children under five were
attributed to malaria in 2008, compared to 30% in 2001 (President’s Malaria Initiative; Senegal
Malaria Operational Plan FY 2013). Significant progress has been made with regards the presence
and use of ITNs by households, particularly the most vulnerable ones, thanks to large-scale
distribution campaigns which will be described below in detail. At the national level, the share of
households declaring that they owned at least one ITN increased from 45% in 2005 to 63% in 2010
(ANSD, 2012). Similarly, bednet availability has recently improved across Africa (Sexton, 2011; de
Savigny et al., 2012).
In Senegal, the untargeted sale of subsidized LL-ITNs is one of the active strategies of the National
Malaria Control Program’s (NMCP) Strategic Plan 2011-2015. As suggested by WHO, this type of
more routine ‘keep-up’ intervention should complement the occasional ‘catch-up’ mass distribution
of free nets campaigns (WHO 2012). In the Senegalese context it is relevant to point out that
distributional campaigns usually implemented some cost-sharing. At the time of our survey, there
was neither a public campaign running nor was there a supply of subsidized bednets in Thies. To
confirm this, we visited a number of health posts, health centers and hospitals in Thies during our
pilot survey, in order to check their availability. This confirmed that no bednets were available at
subsidized prices for the vulnerable population (pregnant women and children younger than five),
nor for the population at large. LL-ITNs were available at privately run pharmacies at prices
ranging from 5000 to 6000 FCFA (USD10-12), whilst non-impregnated bednets were also available
on the market at 1500 to 3000 FCFA (USD3-6).

The NMCP is targeting a 75% reduction in malaria-related mortality (with respect to the baseline
year of 2010) alongside 80% LL-ITN coverage of the general population by 2015 (Senegal Malaria
Operational Plan, FY2013). To fulfill such objectives, a number of LL-ITN distribution campaigns
5

were undertaken, via several different approaches: (i) periodic mass distribution, (ii) targeted
subsidized LL-ITNs for vulnerable groups (pregnant women and children), (iii) untargeted
subsidized distributions (through health facilities and community-based organizations). By 2013,
more than three million LL-ITNs had been sold or delivered to Senegalese households (WHO,
2014).2 The campaigns involved a door-to-door strategy that delivered a voucher for a subsidized
LL-ITN redeemable at certain distribution points. The usual subsidized price was 1000 FCFA
(USD2). The last campaign also included a series of communication interventions to advertise the
campaign and to increase awareness of the importance of using bednets (Thwing et al., 2011).

Health care in Thiès is organized according to a tiered system consisting of health huts (staffed by
community health workers), health posts (staffed by nurses and certified midwives), and health
centers or hospitals (staffed by medical doctors, nurses, and certified midwives). The health district
of Thies has one regional public hospital and one privately run mission hospital. Data for this region
shows that the ratio of inhabitants to health centers is seven times greater than WHO standards,
while the ratio of inhabitants to health posts is in line with international norms (ANSD, 2008).. In
Thiès, there is a large number of health huts, posts and pharmacies. These infrastructures are evenly
distributed geographically and allow for health seeking behavior among households. Episodes of
sickness, in particular malaria, are generally treated at health centers or hospitals. Furthermore,
public campaigns currently allow people to test for malaria at subsidized costs (around USD1).

Methods
Survey area, sampling and data
Data were collected in May and June 2012 in the city of Thies, the third most important city in
Senegal with a population of about 263,500 inhabitants (2007 census) covering an overall area of
approximately 20km square. The city is organized into nine neighborhoods. Our sample consists of
490 households. These households were selected across the whole territory of the city. In order to
obtain a representative sample of the population, the number of households selected in each
neighborhood was proportional to the corresponding population. Since an official list of households
was not available in public records, households in each neighborhood were selected with a pseudorandom selection technique, which followed Afrobarometer’s survey guidelines. Using an official
map of the city, we chose a random set of streets in each neighborhood. A sample of households
was selected on each chosen street. Prior to the beginning of the baseline survey, all neighborhoods
were visited and the list of all streets with private houses was updated. Streets hosting a majority of
2
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economic activities (like markets, shops and public buildings), as opposed to housing, were
excluded from the list. Enumerators were instructed to enter and survey every fifth house on the left
on each chosen street (making our selection process pseudo-random). In case the selected door was
unoccupied, the enumerator had to select the next house. Where settlers were absent, or when
neither the head of household nor the spouse was available, a second visit was scheduled. The status
of a selected household (treated or non-treated) was assigned a priori and our treatments were
stratified by neighborhood (i.e. the proportion of households assigned to each treatment group
within a neighborhood is equal to the total proportion of households in each group). We employed
nine local, independent and qualified enumerators. All had previous experience with surveys and
field work and undertook a two-day training session given by the authors. Special sessions were
dedicated to translation in the local language (Wolof) and to test enumerators’ understanding.
Enumerators were also followed by a local experienced supervisor during the early stage of their
work.

As unit of analysis, the household, we consider nuclear units as composed by spouses, their children
and other members of the family who economically depend of the head of the nuclear unit (Van de
Walle and Gaye, 2005). Enumerators were instructed to randomly select among nuclear units when
entering a house inhabited by an extended family. The reason of this choice lies in the fact that,
most of the time, decisions on health behaviors are made at the nuclear unit. In our context, and this
can safely be extended to the broader national level, the husband is generally considered to be the
breadwinner and the head of the nuclear unit and as such is expected to take the most relevant
economic decisions for the members of his unit (from now on called ‘household’). For 49% of the
households surveyed the respondents was the head.3 In the remaining cases the respondent was
most often the spouse or another adult member of the household. We investigate below the possible
consequences of this. We compensated the respondents for the time spent answering the
questionnaire with a phone recharge of 1000 FCFA (USD2), which was directly provided by the
enumerator before leaving the house (a small minority of households did not own any mobile
phone).
Our baseline survey aimed to obtain information on each household member’s level of education,
health problems (sickness and chronic diseases) and related expenditures, particularly concerning

3

Different reasons can explain why we could only have half the heads answering the questionnaire. In many cases they
do not live on the dwelling visited for work related reasons and only pay regular/irregular visits to the household. A
limited number of heads did not have the time to answer and delegated either their spouse or another adult. We did not
meet anybody who refused to take part in the survey.
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malaria. Since public campaigns about malaria specifically target pregnant woman and children
under five years of age, we made sure to identify such households in our analysis. Household
income represents the sum of all sources of monthly income (labour income or wage, rent and
received transfers) across all active members of the household. Due to the sensitivity of such
questions and the reticence to provide exact amounts, answers were in most cases collected by
offering ten income intervals. We then categorized this variable into quintiles. We computed a
synthetic measure of durable goods or assets owned by the households as a proxy for wealth. This is
simply the sum of a list of items comprising, among others, a series of kitchen and home appliances,
mobile phone, bicycle, motorcycle, car, sewing machine, different pieces of furniture, etc.
Additionally, we identified whether the household owned their dwelling unit. We tested, at the
baseline, the knowledge of basic information on malaria and public bednet distribution policies
through a set of true-false questions. We used five questions to test the level of knowledge on
malaria.4 A second set of questions were aimed at understanding the extent to which people were
aware of past public bednet distribution campaigns and their features.5 Concerning malaria
prevention, we asked people to list all known methods. We also investigated what symptoms are
associated with malaria, the knowledge of LL-ITNs and their market price. We collected
information on the ownership, type, number, date and source of obtainment of any bednets in the
house and the reason why one does not have one. For those declaring that at least one bednet was
owned, we asked if it was used the previous night and by which member of the household.6

Experimental design and empirical approach
Treatments were randomly assigned at the household level after stratifying at the level of
neighbourhood. Around 43% of the sample received our short information session on malaria
during the baseline survey, whilst the remainder did not. After testing prior knowledge of malaria
causes, means of transmission, prevention and use of bednets, enumerators presented a short
informational module of around 7 minutes. This provided information on the following eight
points7: 1) How malaria can be contracted; 2) Incidence of malaria in Senegal and its particular
impact on mortality and sickness for pregnant women and children under 9 years old; 3) Average
4

We asked respondents to state whether the following statements were true or false (the share of correct answers is
given in parenthesis): 1. Malaria is a contagious disease (30) (false); 2. Mosquitoes contaminate food (68)
(false); 3. Mosquitoes transmit the disease in daylight (73) (false); 4. Mosquitoes reproduce themselves in stagnant
water sites (98) (true); 5. Mosquitoes transmit malaria by just biting the skin (91) (true).
5
We asked to state whether the following statements were true or false (the share of correct answers is given in
parenthesis): During a public bednet distribution campaign: 1. If I go to the health centre I can get free bednets for
children less than 5 (65) (true); 2. Pregnant women can get free bednets at health posts and health centres (69) (true); 3.
Everybody can get bednets at subsidized prices at health centres (76) (true).
6
We also collected data which allowed us to elicit discount rate and risk parameters. These parameters were used as
control variables in a previous version of this paper and they did not have any effect on take-up of bednets.
7
A detailed description of the content of the information session is provided in Appendix 1.
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size of health expenses due to malaria in the city of Thies (based on the data collected during our
pilot survey); 4) Benefits from the use of LL-ITNs in terms of lower incidence of malaria, lower
expenditure and consequent possible savings from its use (also based on the data collected in Thies
during our pilot survey); 5) Importance of having a bednet for every bed and its use throughout the
year; 6) Availability of bednets in Thies and where they can be purchased (namely at pharmacies at
full price: around 5000 FCFA - USD10); 7) Availability of subsidized bednets during public
campaigns and discussion on the timing of such campaigns; 8) How to effectively use LL-ITNs.
Our two treatments were set up to mimic ones that could be deployed on a large scale such as a
national campaign. As such the information needed to be uniformly conveyed in a relatively short
period of time to a large audience. Its content (with the addition of point 3 listed above in this
paragraph) is similar to different posters on the topic that can be found in various pharmacy or
health clinics in the region. Our information treatment was thus not designed to be tailored to each
participant with a refined curriculum that would engage with each participant’s experience with
malaria. We understand that such a campaign is likely to be more effective but takes significantly
more time and is practically difficult to implement on a large scale.

Independently from the information treatment, households were assigned to the LL-ITN sale
treatment. Half of the sample (53%) was proposed the on-the-spot sale of one LL-ITN at the
subsidized price of 1000 FCFA (USD2). The validity of the offer was immediate and lasted around
15 minutes (the average time it took to complete the questionnaire at that stage). Respondents were
allowed to discuss the purchase with anyone if they wished so. The second half of the sample (47%)
received a voucher valid for 7 days, during which the respondent could contact the enumerator to
receive one LL-ITN at the subsidized price of 1000 FCFA (USD2). Once ordered by phone, the LLITN was delivered at an agreed meeting point by the enumerator. Each enumerator had one easy-tofind point of delivery in each neighborhood.

To assess the impact of the sale and information treatments on the effective demand for LL-ITNs,
we estimate the following model through a linear probability model (LPM) by Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS):
𝐵𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖′ 𝛽 + 𝛼 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖 + 𝛿 𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
In the equation, B is a dummy variable that takes the value one when the household bought an LLITN and the value zero otherwise. Info is a dummy variable that equals one when the household was
provided with information on malaria. Voucher is a dummy variable that equals one when the
household was given a voucher and equals zero if offered to buy a LL-ITN on the spot. X is a vector
9

of covariates which contains respondents’ characteristics (gender, education, age, marital status),
two indicators of household wealth, presence of household members who would benefit from free
bednets in case of campaign (namely targeted groups: pregnant women or children under the age of
five), household size, ownership of bednets (any type: whether insecticide-treated or not),
experience of malaria cases in the last year and our two knowledge scores. Households are indexed
with the subscript i. The coefficients of interest are α and δ, which measure the effects of receiving
information on malaria and of receiving a voucher on the respective probability of buying an LLITN.

We are also interested in testing four relevant hypothesis on the heterogeneous effects of the
impacts coming from our treatments. First we want to know whether households with targeted
members (pregnant women and children under the age of five) are more susceptible of purchasing a
LL-ITN following our two treatments. Households with members belonging to these vulnerable
groups may respond more positively to our information and voucher treatments by seeking to
provide a LL-ITN for them. Second, we look at the effectiveness of the voucher for different levels
of income. Our intuition is that the voucher could have a greater impact on the uptake for poorer
households. It could give additional time to cash-constrained households to find the necessary funds
for the purchase. Third, we want to check if the information treatment has a greater impact on
respondents with low levels of education or low level of prior knowledge on malaria. The intuition
being that the information we offer is likely to have less impact on respondents who already know a
significant part of it. This may be the case for highly educated respondents and those who scored
highly in our knowledge test about malaria. Finally, we want to see if households who do not
already own a LL-ITN are more likely to react to our treatments. These households may ignore the
benefit of owning a LL-ITN and our treatment may have a greater impact on them. Households who
already own one have a better idea of their benefits and may be inclined to buy another one, either
through our voucher or information session acting as a reminder. Conversely, such benefits may not
be obvious to these owners and our treatment of little impact on the decision to purchase. The tests
of treatments heterogeneities is based on the inclusion of the interactions of relevant treatments and
the specific variables measured at the baseline in the model shown above.

Random assignment of treatments is tested by comparing sample means of our variables measured
at the baseline across different treatment samples. We compute adjusted differences between
treatment and control groups, obtained from a regression of the baseline variable on the treatment
variable and neighbourhood fixed effects, i.e. stratification variables. P-values of the T-test of the
10

treatment coefficient are computed and shown. It is not uncommon for random assignment of
treatments in small samples like ours to be unbalanced. The presence of observed differences
between treated and non-treated groups is taken into account during estimation. The first approach
used for this is to systematically include all relevant controls, in the set of covariates in our
estimation models. The second approach used is to re-weight the sample using entropy balancing so
that the first three moments computed by treated and non-treated groups are equalized (Hainmueller
and Xu, 2013).

Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the allocation of the sample across treatments and the proportion of households
who bought an LL-ITN within subsamples according to treatment status. Following the treatments,
44 % of households purchased an LL-ITN. About 56% of household that received a voucher
redeemed it within seven days and bought an LL-ITN at a subsidized price, compared to only 34%
of households exposed to the on-the-spot sale. The difference of 22 percentage points between these
two proportions is significant (p <0.001). Regarding the information treatment, 46% of households
provided with the information bought an LL-ITN, slightly higher than the proportion of households
(43%) who bought the LL-ITN with no additional information on malaria. In this case however, the
difference is not statistically significant (p=0.151).

[Insert Table 1 here]

Table 2 reports, for the whole sample of 490 respondents, the mean and standard deviation for all
variables which are relevant in the analysis. A majority of our respondents are female and live in a
couple. 49% of our respondents are head of household of which 80% are male. These individuals
represent 39% of our overall sample. In the next section we look at the potential impact of
surveying non-head of households on the purchase of LL-ITNs.

The average household size is six and around 45% of respondents attended secondary school or
higher levels of education (successfully completed at least six years of schooling). 58% of the
households surveyed are susceptible of being targeted households in a distribution campaign. That
is to say they have at least one member who is either a pregnant woman or a child under five years
of age. Around three quarters of our households own the dwelling unit where they live. Regarding
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malaria, we observed that 46% of sampled households had experienced at least one episode of
malaria during the year prior to the survey.

[Insert Table 2 here]
The average score out of 5 for the variable ‘Malaria knowledge score’ is 3.6 (median is 4).8 The
mean of the variable ‘Anti-Malaria campaigns knowledge score’ (out of 3) is 2.1 and half of our
sample correctly answered all questions; 13% correctly answered none. There is only a weak
correlation (0.015) between the two knowledge scores. Across all levels of malaria knowledge
score, a large majority of respondents are fully aware of what public bednet distribution campaigns
involve, in terms of distribution sites, targeted groups (pregnant women and children under the age
of five) and subsidized prices. Concerning malaria prevention, 93% of interviewees mention the use
of bednets, 42% the employment of insecticide sprays and 59% the avoidance of stagnant water
nearby the house. The most cited symptoms of malaria are high temperature (86%), nausea (60%)
and headache (42%). Only 2% of respondents could not name any (correct) malaria symptom.
These statistics convey a relatively high degree of awareness, means of prevention and
identification of malaria. In spite of the awareness of the importance of the use of bednets, only
28% of respondents declared that they knew what a LL-ITN was; only 12% knew the correct retail
price of the product in private pharmacies. More than half of sampled household respondents (59%)
claimed to have at least one bednet at home. The most common reasons for not having bednets are
negligence (47%), lack of means (19%) and use of other methods (12%). Conditional on owning at
least one bednet, the average number of bednets per household is about 2.4, whereas if we consider
the whole sample, the number decreases to 1.4. Considering an average household size of 6
members, it is entirely possible that the number of bednets owned is insufficient to cover the entire
sampled population, even after considering the possibility that several members of the household,
such as children or couples, share the same bednet. Among households owning a bednet, only 17%
had impregnated ones.9 Moreover, although respondents claimed to have owned bednets for over 2
years (on average), only 10% of owners had re-impregnated them within the last year. 41% of
bednet owners paid to acquire them (the average price paid is about 2000FCFA, around USD4),
whereas the remaining 59% said that bednets were obtained for free at health posts or centers,
hospitals, or were distributed by the neighborhood chief or some NGOs during previous distribution
8

To investigate heterogeneity along the knowledge of malaria in the regression analysis which follows, the malaria
knowledge score has been split into two categories, low (0-2) and high (3-5), whose shares in the sample are 14.5 and
85.5%, respectively. There are no significant differences in these shares across the sub-samples for our two treatments.
9
It is likely that the number of ITNs or LL-ITNs is underestimated due to the lack of awareness of the properties of the
product.
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campaigns. In the sample, 18% (22%) of pregnant women (children younger than five) responded
that they slept under a LL-ITN the night preceding the interview. This number is slightly lower than
the 22% (28%) who declared that pregnant women (children) slept under ITNs in the previous 12
months according to the large scale DHS (2010-12).

Table 2 also shows the tests for random assignment of treatments, through the comparison of
adjusted means. Our randomization with respect to the sale treatment (voucher) appears to be
satisfactory. Some significant differences are observed between households who were given the
information treatment and those who were not. These are related to attributes of the respondent:
namely is gender, whether he/she is the head, education levels and the malaria knowledge score.
The mean comparison tests also suggest significant differences with respect to household size.
Additional balance tests, not shown, on all our nine neighborhoods and ten enumerator dummies,
indicate that almost all (18 out of 19) of these controls are balanced with respect to our two
treatment assignments.

Results
Table 3 displays the results of the LPM, estimated by OLS.10 The different columns present the
regression coefficients of our treatment variables when we include baseline controls and
neighborhood fixed effects. The first two columns display the results for the unbalanced sample and
the last two the balanced one.11 We find that providing a voucher to buy an LL-ITN within seven
days has a significant and positive effect on the probability of purchase, compared to an on-the-spot
sale offer. The magnitude of the effect is between 22 and 24 percentage points. This corresponds to
a 60% to 65.5% increase in take-up rate with respect to the control group receiving on the spot sale
and no information. We also find that providing information on malaria has, on average, no
significant effect on the probability of buying an LL-ITN. Controlling for treatments, households in
the first income quintile buy on average 19% more than rich ones (the fifth quintile is the
benchmark). The coefficient for the first quintile is lower than for quintile two, three and four but
the difference is not statistically significant. The various levels of education included in the
specification appear to play no significant role.

[Insert Table 3 here]
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Our results are similar if we use probit or logit estimation technique. They are available upon request.
The differences we observe between the two sets are small and attributable to a satisfactory random assignment for
the voucher treatment and only some significant differences for the information treatment.
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In table 4 we investigate whether the effects of the two treatments display any heterogeneity. We
first look at a targeted subpopulation: households with a pregnant woman and/or with a child under
five years old (columns 1 and 2). The difference of estimated treatment effects within this group is
not significant both for voucher and information. In column 3 and 4, we find that the voucher had
no differential effect depending on the gender of the respondent, neither alone, nor in combination
with the marital status (i.e. living in a couple). In column 5, the heterogeneity of the voucher effect
is estimated across income quintiles. We find no heterogeneous effects of the voucher treatment
along the household income dimension.

[Insert Table 4 here]

Finally, we investigate the heterogeneity of the information effect across education groups (column
6) and baseline malaria knowledge scores (column 7). Receiving the information treatment session
increases the probability of buying the LL-ITN by 34.5 percentage points for households where the
respondent has no formal education, compared to those where the respondent has a high level of
schooling (above secondary education). The result is significant at 5% confidence level. A positive
and significant heterogeneous effect of the information treatment is found on respondents with low
level of knowledge of malaria (+20 percentage points, significant at 10% level). In column 8, we
find differential effects (+18.0 percentage points, significant at 5% level) of the informational
treatment amongst households who do not own at least one bednet (any type: whether insecticidetreated or not). No effect is found for the voucher treatment for households who own already at least
one bednet. Column 10 reports the results for the full model specification where all the interactions
have been included. All previous results are confirmed except for the interaction between the
informational treatment and low malaria score.

Discussion
The result on the informational treatment suggests that improving literacy on the prevention of
malaria, on morbidity due to malaria or direct and indirect costs generated by an episode of malaria,
has, on average, no significant effect on buying an LL-ITN. One interpretation is that the
information session did not sufficiently increase the expected benefits of bednet usage to a level that
outweighed the costs.12 It is also possible that knowledge about malaria was, on average within our
sample, sufficiently high to make this session ineffective. The quality of the delivery of this
information could have played a role. However, we believe this to be unlikely, given that the
12

Alternatively, because of liquidity constraints, people might not have been able to pay either on the spot or within a
week for a LL-ITN, despite the expected high benefits.
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session was short and well-rehearsed by our enumerators during our pilot. The coefficient on the
variable “info” is not affected if we introduce enumerators fixed effects. We also ensured that the
content of the information session was identical across households and included health and financial
framing. Both health and financial-related consequences of malaria were described to households,
as well as various means of prevention. Enumerators were trained to deliver the information module
uniformly. They were instructed to go through the eight information items listed above in the same
sequence and to provide the same set of facts and details.

It is notable that our tests, based on our actual sample sizes, could detect expected effect size at the
design phase (of 10-15%) with power well above the threshold of 80%, which is widely considered
as satisfactory. Thus, lack of power is not considered an issue.13 The ineffective role of information
on take-up is not specific to this study; it has also been observed in different contexts, notably
related to the purchase of health insurance and financial technology (Bonan et al., 2012; Thornton et
al., 2010; Cole et al., 2013). Our finding is also in line with that of other works which found that
social marketing treatments, under the form of promotional messages, had no effect on bednet
purchase in Kenya (Dupas, 2009).

The positive and significant effect on purchase obtained through the voucher shows the advantage
in guaranteeing a subsidized price over a week. Households who use the voucher opt for a delayed
purchase and do not need to have “cash-on-hand”, an amount of money to be used immediately, to
purchase the LL-ITN. Our results seem to indicate that the most important factor at play is the cash
constraints that households face. This constraint on take-up is also highlighted elsewhere (Dupas,
2009 ; Holla and Kremer, 2009; Tarozzi et al., 2014). Another plausible explanation is that the
respondent, who in 49% of cases was the head, needed to consult with their spouse or somebody
else in the household in order to approve the purchase, which imposed a delay on the decision to
purchase. As we mention earlier, men tend to have greater say over household purchases than
women. If this mechanism is important we would expect that households in which a man was
interviewed and presented the opportunity to purchase an LL-ITN would be relatively unaffected by
the additional time to confer with other members. The man would be relatively able to make the
decision unilaterally. However, given that the interaction terms of 1) respondent is male and
‘voucher’ and 2) respondent is male, ‘voucher’ and the respondent lives in couple are both not
significant in table 4 (in columns 3, 4 and 10), this explanation may not be valid within our context.
13

If we fix the level of power at 80% and use a 10% alpha, our design could detect the following effect sizes: i) 0.095
for the voucher arm based on the actual uptake rate for the on-the-spot arm of 0.34 and ii) 0.097 for the info arm based
on the actual rate of uptake for the no info arm of 0.43.
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Furthermore, results from table 3 in columns 2 and 4 where the dummy ‘the respondent is male’ is
not significant seem to confirm this or could indicate that potential differences in preferences
towards bednets for men and women do not seem to play a significant role. The lack of systematic
gender differences in the willingness to invest in anti-malaria bednets is also found in another study
(Dupas, 2009).

Heterogeneous effects displayed in table 4 show that households with targeted members (pregnant
women and children under the age of five) seem no more susceptible of purchasing a LL-ITN
following our two treatments than other households. This despite emphasizing the incidence of
malaria in Senegal and its particular impact on mortality and sickness for these groups in our
information treatment. Results in column 5 indicate no significant heterogenous impact across the
four different income quintile included (the benchmark being income the richest quintile 5). To get
a coefficient for each of the five quintile for the sample which received the voucher we compute the
marginal effects, using post-regression contrast margins for the model in column 5 (Figure 1).

[Insert Figure 1 here]

Figure 1 shows that with 95% confidence interval the first income quintile is not statistically
different from zero, while all the other are (results holds if we use a 90% confidence interval). This
indicates that the households belonging to income quintiles two to five are more likely to buy a LLITN after receiving the voucher than when being treated with an on-the-spot sale. However, this is
not the case for households in the poorest quintile who buy as much with both the voucher and onthe-spot sale.

Table 5 displays the rates of purchase per income quintile for both arms of the sale treatment. For
the on-the-spot treatment, the share of households who purchased in the first income quintile (32%)
is not significantly different to all other quintiles (at 5% level). As such, the poorest respondents do
not appear comparatively cash constrained. If we compare the purchase rate for the voucher,
respondents from the first quintile have the lowest rate. The first quintile is indeed the only quintile
which shows no significant difference between the two arms of the treatment. The poorest do buy, if
they can afford on the spot, and providing them with the flexibility of a 7-day voucher does not
significantly change that rate. One reason could be that the poorest are not as cash-constrained as
we imply. The mean household income for the first quintile is 49000 FCFA and a subsidized LLITN at 1000 FCFA represents only 2% of their monthly income. Instead, the poorest might have
limited attention (‘scarcity of attention’) to the necessity of buying a bednet. Drawing their
16

attention, with an on-the-spot sale, to such a need brings it to the ‘top of mind’. If given a voucher,
the poorest may have the cash at hands but decide to postpone the purchase for a few days. It is
plausible that this then allows various other pressures and demands on their small income to take
precedence. This may then divert their attention to other more pressing issues and expenses. Even if
the LL-ITN stays salient this will take cash away from its purchase. This dynamic has also been
found in different contexts (Shah et al., 2012; Datta and Mullainathan, 2014; Karlan et al., 2016).
For the poorest, the strong incentives of a short-lived on-the-spot sale and the flexibility of the 7day voucher lead to similar rate of purchase.
The descriptive statistics for both arms combined show that both income quintiles 1 and 5 have
significantly lower rates of purchase than other middle quintiles (at a 10% level of significance).
These differences, at the combined level, are partially explained by the fact that the poorest are less
responsive to the voucher. Overall, the very poor are relatively more hampered in their access to
LL-ITN, even when they are sold at such a low subsidized price. This should be stressed to
governments and NGOs which organize distribution strategies that are based on cost sharing. For
the households in the richest quintile who could afford to buy a LL-ITN from a pharmacy without
the subsidy we offer, our treatment appear less effective and represent a weak incentive.

[Insert Table 5 here]

The positive heterogeneous effect from the information session we observe for respondents with no
education is confirmed by figure 2. Based on model 6 of table 4, it shows the predictive margins for
all interactions of the information treatment and the four education levels.
At the baseline, there are significant differences in our variable ‘malaria knowledge score’ across
different levels of schooling. As intuition would suggest: respondents with no schooling tend to get
lower scores than educated ones. This may partially explain why our information session has a
positive and significant impact on the respondents with no schooling. Our information session also
stressed direct and indirect costs of a malaria episode which was not covered in our five questions
quiz used to construct the ‘Malaria knowledge score’. This type of financial information may have
had a particular impact on the respondents who have never attended school. It is also possible that
the fact that our information session was offered in a one-on-one environment could have been
particularly suited to respondents who are unlikely to be able to read and to be reactive to different
format of public campaign. There is also a significant positive heterogeneous effect from our
information session for respondents who obtained a low malaria score (0-2) in our baseline
knowledge test of five questions. Households who do not own a bednet (any type: whether
17

insecticide-treated or not) previous to our treatments are more likely to react positively and
significantly to the information treatment but not to the voucher.
[Insert Figure 2 here]

Our results highlight significant heterogeneous effects from the information session related to: lack
of education and the use of bednet within the household and to low level of baseline knowledge on
malaria. They suggest that information may be effective on those with no schooling, poor
knowledge of malaria and those with no direct experience in the use of bednets. One can argue that
these individuals are the ones who are likely to attribute a lesser value to the LL-ITN. According to
our findings they can be influenced into buying an LL-ITN following our information treatment.
These heterogeneous effects suggest that targeting the information treatment to these subgroups
might represent a more efficient way of using limited advertisement or campaigning resources.

Conclusion
This paper investigates the demand for Long Lasting Insecticide Treated Nets (LL-ITNs) in a region
where malaria is endemic and malaria prevention weak. Our findings show that, on average, the
information session has no effect on the demand for LL-ITNs. This result is not surprising if we
consider some of the recent literature on the effect of information on the demand for health related
products. However, we observed a significant effect of information on respondents who had never
attended school, have low malaria score and have no direct experience in the use of LL-ITNs. This
suggests that targeting households when giving information would be a more efficient way of
increasing take-up. Both our descriptive statistics and our regression analysis indicate the
importance of the role played by the voucher. Being given a 7-day voucher for purchase at a
subsidized price increases the probability of LL-ITN purchase by 23 percentage points, on average,
compared to an on-the-spot sale offer. This result may highlights the importance of cash constraints
faced by many households across most income quintiles. Except for the very poorest households (1st
quintile) who show similar rate of purchase for both the voucher and the on-the-spot sale.

18

References
Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie (ANSD) [Sénégal], and ICF International.
(2012). Enquête Démographique et de Santé à Indicateurs Multiples au Sénégal (EDS-MICS) 20102011. Calverton, Maryland, USA: ANSD et ICF International.
ANSD (2008). Situation Economique et Sociale de la Region de Thies. Available from
http://www.ansd.sn/publications_SES_ region.html
Barofsky, J., Anekwe, T.D. and Chase, C. (2015) Malaria eradication and economic outcomes in
sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence from Uganda, Journal of Health Economics, 44, 118-136
Bhattacharyya S. (2009) ‘Root Causes of African Underdevelopment’ Journal of African
Economies, 18(5): 745-780.
Bonan J., Dagnelie O., LeMay-Boucher, P. and M. Tenikue, (2012). ‘Is it all about Money? A
Randomized Evaluation of the Impact of Insurance Literacy and Marketing Treatments on the
Demand for Health Microinsurance in Senegal’ Research paper nº14, International Labour
Organisation, Microinsurance Facility.
Cohen, J., Dupas, P. (2010) ‘Free Distribution or Cost-Sharing? Evidence from a Randomized
Malaria Prevention Experiment’ The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 125(1): 1-45.
Cole, S., Gine, X., Tobacman, J., Topalova, P., Townsend, R., & Vickery, J. (2013) ‘Barriers to
Household Risk Management: Evidence from India’ American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics, 5(1): 104-35
Datta, S., and Mullainathan, S. (2014) ‘Behavioral Design: A New Approach to Development
Policy’ Review of Income and Wealth, 60: 7–35.
Don de Savigny, Jayne Webster, Irene Akua Agyepong, Alex Mwita,Constance Bart-Plange, Aba
Baffoe-Wilmot, Hannah Koenker, Karen Kramer,Nick Brown, and Christian Lengeler (2012)
‘Introducing vouchers for malaria prevention in Ghana and Tanzania: context and adoption of
innovation in health systems’ Health Policy Planning, 27: iv32-iv43.
Dupas, P. (2009) ‘What Matters (and What Does Not) in Households’ Decision to Invest in Malaria
Prevention?’ American Economic Review 99(2): 224-230.
Dupas, P. (2014) ‘Short-Run Subsidies and Long-Run Adoption of New Health Products: Evidence
from a Field Experiment’ Econometrica, 82(1): 197–228.
Gallup L and JD Sachs (2001) ‘The economic burden of malaria’ American Journal of Tropical
Medical Hygiene, 64:85-96.
Gimnig, John E., Margarette S. Kolczak, Allen W. Hightower, John M. Vulule, Erik Schoute, Luna
Kamau, Penelope A. Phillips-Howard, Feiko O. Ter Kuile, Bernard L. Nahlen, and William A.
Hawley (2003) ‘Effect of Permethrin-Treated Bed Nets on the Spatial Distribution of Malaria
Vectors in Western Kenya’ American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 68, 115–120.
Hainmueller, Jens, and Yiqing Xu. (2013). ‘Ebalance: A Stata Package for Entropy Balancing.’
Journal of Statistical Software 54(7).
19

Holla Alaka and Kremer Michael (2009) ‘Pricing and Access: Lessons from Randomized
Evaluations in Education and Health’ CGDEV Working Paper Number 158
Karlan, D., McConnell, M., Mullainathan, S., and Zinman, J. (2016) ‘Getting to the Top of Mind:
How Reminders Increase Saving’ Management Science, forthcoming.
Lengeler C. (2004) ‘Insecticide-treated bed nets and curtains for preventing malaria’ Cochrane
Database of Systematic Reviews, Issue 2.
Lucas, Adrienne M. (2010). ‘Malaria Eradication and Educational Attainment: Evidence from
Paraguay and Sri Lanka’ American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(2): 46–71.
President’s Malaria Initiative, Malaria Operational Plan FY 2013, Senegal
Sexton, A.R. (2011) ‘Best practices for an insecticide-treated bed net distribution programme in
sub-Saharan eastern Africa’ Malaria Journal, 10:157.
Shah, A.K., Mullainathan, S., and Shafir, E. (2012) ‘Some Consequences of Having Too Little’
Science 338, 682–685.
Tarozzi, A., Mahajan, A., Blackburn, B., Kopf, D., Krishnan, L., and Yoong, J. (2014) ‘Microloans, Insecticide-Treated Bednets, and Malaria: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial in
Orissa, India’. American Economic Review, 104: 1909–1941.
Thornton, R., Hatt, L., Field, E., Mursaleena, I., Diaz, F. & Gonzales M. (2010) ‘Social Security
Health Insurance for the Informal Sector in Nicaragua: a Randomized Evaluation.’ Health
Economics, 19(S1), 181–206.
Thwing, J.I., Perry R.T., Townes, D.A., Diouf, M.B., Ndiaye, S. and Thior M. (2011) ‘Success of
Senegal’s first nationwide distribution of long-lasting insecticide-treated nets to children under five:
contribution toward universal coverage.’ Malaria Journal, 10: 86.
Van de Walle E., A. Gaye (2005) ‘Household structure, polygyny, and ethnicity in Senegambia: a
comparison of census methodologies.’ E. Van de Walle (Ed.), African households: censuses and
surveys, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, N.Y., USA: 3–21.
WHO (2015, 2014, 2012, 2011) World Malaria Report

20

Appendix 1
Our information treatment consisted in providing the following eight points of information:
1) The malaria parasite is transmitted primarily at night, when someone is bitten by a female
mosquito.
2) Malaria is the first cause of mortality in Senegal for pregnant women and children under 5 years.
3) Malaria is the main reason behind most medical consultations for Senegalese and therefore the
main item for health care spending.
4) Our research in the city of Thies shows that households that use bednets are less affected by
malaria and spend least for treatment. Households who use bednets regularly can make about
2000FCFA of savings per year in health care expenditures.
5) According to the Senegalese Ministry of Health and the World Health Organization: the best way
to prevent malaria is to sleep under a bednet.
6) It is important to have mosquito bednets for all family members and use them throughout the
year.
7) Long Lasting Insecticide Treated Nets are available in health centers and hospitals.
8) Mosquito nets are free for pregnant women and for children under five at health centers. For the
rest of the population they are available at a subsidized price of 1,000 FCFA.
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Figure 1. Contrast predictive margins for the coefficients Voucher*Income quintiles
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Notes: 95% confidence interval, based on model 5 presented in table 4.

Figure 2. Contrast predictive margins for the coefficients Voucher*Education levels
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Table 1. Allocation across treatments and rate of household who bought LL-ITN by treatment
Treatment Information
Treatment Sale

Yes

No

Total

Spot Sale

0.36

0.33

0.34

(102)

(159)

(261)

0.55

0.57

0.56

(109)

(120)

(229)

0.46

0.43

0.44

Voucher
Total

(211)
(279)
(490)
Note: Fractions refer to the proportion of households who bought a LL-ITN; figures within brackets represent the size
of each subsample, the total sample is 490.
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Table 2. Mean, standard deviation, and comparisons of adjusted means of different treatment arms
Balance of treatments tests
Information Treatment
Mean

SD

Mean
Treat

Diff

Voucher Treatment
P value

Control

Mean
Treat

Diff

P value

Control

The respondent is male

0.388

0.488

0.348

0.441

-0.094

0.035

0.397

0.379

0.018

0.688

Age of the respondent

44.559

13.527

44.086

45.185

-0.973

0.429

44.153

44.916

-0.794

0.515

The respondent is the head

0.488

0.500

0.444

0.545

-0.104

0.023

0.515

0.464

0.051

0.266

Respondent has no educ

0.288

0.453

0.330

0.232

0.095

0.019

0.262

0.310

-0.052

0.195

Respondent has primary educ

0.263

0.441

0.262

0.265

-0.007

0.869

0.279

0.249

0.031

0.436

Respondent has secondary educ

0.276

0.447

0.240

0.322

-0.079

0.050

0.306

0.249

0.060

0.135

Respondent has post-secondary educ

0.173

0.379

0.168

0.180

-0.008

0.806

0.153

0.192

-0.039

0.252

Household head is Male

0.880

0.326

0.871

0.891

-0.017

0.574

0.873

0.885

-0.010

0.721

The respondent lives in couple

0.900

0.300

0.903

0.896

0.007

0.785

0.900

0.900

-0.001

0.976

Household size

5.969

2.600

6.140

5.744

0.421

0.074

5.843

6.080

-0.243

0.298

Targeted hh during campaign

0.584

0.493

0.588

0.578

0.009

0.846

0.590

0.579

0.013

0.778

Income quintile 1

0.192

0.394

0.172

0.218

-0.050

0.155

0.192

0.192

-0.003

0.942

Income quintile 2

0.204

0.403

0.219

0.185

0.034

0.349

0.210

0.199

0.010

0.791

Income quintile 3

0.200

0.400

0.194

0.209

-0.015

0.684

0.197

0.203

-0.006

0.874

Income quintile 4

0.273

0.446

0.280

0.265

0.015

0.708

0.253

0.291

-0.035

0.384

Income quintile 5

0.131

0.337

0.136

0.123

0.016

0.611

0.148

0.115

0.034

0.273

Household owns dwelling unit

0.743

0.438

0.749

0.735

0.011

0.777

0.747

0.739

0.010

0.798

Assets (sum of items)

7.982

4.505

7.896

8.095

-0.105

0.790

7.694

8.234

-0.520

0.185

>1 episode of malaria previous year

0.463

0.499

0.444

0.488

-0.037

0.413

0.437

0.487

-0.046

0.298

No bednet in the hh

0.402

0.491

0.423

0.374

0.041

0.346

0.415

0.391

0.017

0.692

Malaria knowledge score, out of 5
3.606
1.026
3.509
3.735
-0.207
0.025
3.572
3.636
-0.055
0.545
Anti-Malaria campaigns knowledge
score, out of 3
2.120
1.095
2.072
2.185
-0.089
0.348
2.114
2.126
-0.013
0.889
Notes: Diff is the adjusted difference of means between Treated and Control. P-val is the P-value of the treatment coefficients in a regression where baseline variables are regressed
on the treatment variables and neighbourhood fixed effects. The shares of respondents in income quintiles 4 and 5 differ substantially from 20%. This is due to the fact that we have
a disproportionate number of observations at a particular value (a midvalue of an income interval in the questionnaire) which cannot be split and is set to belong to quintile 4.
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Table 3. Take-up of LL-ITN, main effects
Dependent variable =1 if purchased LL-ITN
Unbalanced sample
Balanced sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Treatment Sale (Voucher)
Information session

0.220***
(0.0442)
-0.00270
(0.0446)

The respondent is male
Age of the respondent
Respondent has no education
Respondent has primary education
Respondent has Secondary education
Respondent lives in couple
Household size
Targeted household during campaign
Income quintile 1
Income quintile 2
Income quintile 3
Income quintile 4
Household owns the dwelling unit
Assets (sum of items)
At least one episode of malaria previous year
No bednet in the hh
Low malaria score (0-2)
Low anti-malaria campaign score (0-1)
Constant

0.303***
(0.0856)

0.239*** 0.238*** 0.238***
(0.0430) (0.0446) (0.0420)
0.0200
-0.0133
0.0164
(0.0437) (0.0452) (0.0435)
0.000885
0.00751
(0.0546)
(0.0538)
0.00189
0.00250
(0.00210)
(0.00212)
-0.122
-0.116
(0.0810)
(0.0798)
-0.122
-0.116
(0.0789)
(0.0771)
0.0375
0.0484
(0.0713)
(0.0708)
0.0431
0.0414
(0.0776)
(0.0789)
0.00526
0.00913
(0.00936)
(0.00956)
-0.0192
-0.0321
(0.0504)
(0.0492)
0.185**
0.200**
(0.0835)
(0.0819)
0.319***
0.336***
(0.0812)
(0.0807)
0.218***
0.207***
(0.0755)
(0.0731)
0.252***
0.268***
(0.0694)
(0.0673)
-0.0845
-0.0705
(0.0544)
(0.0539)
0.0103*
0.00887
(0.00601)
(0.00628)
0.0787*
0.0722
(0.0444)
(0.0440)
-0.0353
-0.0387
(0.0473)
(0.0473)
-0.102*
-0.121**
(0.0599)
(0.0585)
0.112**
0.114**
(0.0482)
(0.0480)
-0.117
0.263***
-0.137
(0.172)
(0.0704)
(0.173)

Observations
490
490
490
490
R-squared
0.074
0.160
0.080
0.173
Neighbourhood FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Mean Dependent Variable
0.363
0.363
0.363
0.363
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications
include neighbourhood fixed effects. The mean dependent variable refers to the take-up rate of
the group which received on the spot sale and no information.
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Table 4. Take-up of LL-ITN, heterogeneous effects
Dependent variable =1 if purchased LL-ITN

(1)
Treatment Sale (Voucher)
Information session (Info)
Info*Targeted group
Voucher*Targeted group
Voucher*The respondent is male
Voucher*Respondent is male*Respondent lives in couple
Voucher*Income quintile 1
Voucher*Income quintile 2
Voucher*Income quintile 3
Voucher*Income quintile 4
Info*Respondent has no education
Info*Respondent has primary education
Info*Respondent has Secondary education
Info*Low malaria score (0-2)
Info*No bednet in the household
Voucher*No bednet in the household

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

0.236*** 0.203*** 0.268*** 0.256*** 0.232** 0.241*** 0.241*** 0.242*** 0.283*** 0.283**
(0.0431) (0.0680) (0.0548) (0.0541) (0.111) (0.0431) (0.0430) (0.0431) (0.0558) (0.131)
0.104
0.0211
0.0213
0.0208
0.0174 -0.174* -0.00695 -0.0522
0.0193
-0.168
(0.0683) (0.0438) (0.0439) (0.0439) (0.0440) (0.105) (0.0477) (0.0550) (0.0438) (0.131)
-0.144
-0.104
(0.0914)
(0.0945)
0.0612
0.0389
(0.0888)
(0.0900)
-0.0744
-0.396
(0.0923)
(0.347)
-0.0446
0.342
(0.0912)
(0.340)
-0.0959
-0.0879
(0.154)
(0.155)
0.0971
0.105
(0.150)
(0.150)
0.00946
-0.00938
(0.146)
(0.146)
0.0127
-0.0136
(0.142)
(0.144)
0.345***
0.280**
(0.133)
(0.138)
0.196
0.161
(0.135)
(0.138)
0.171
0.165
(0.133)
(0.137)
0.199*
0.137
(0.117)
(0.120)
0.180**
0.155*
(0.0892)
(0.0911)
-0.110
-0.0966
(0.0913) (0.0942)
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Constant

Observations
R-squared
Controls
Neighbourhood FE
Mean Dependent Variable

-0.158
(0.184)

-0.0956
(0.182)

-0.133
(0.182)

-0.128
(0.183)

-0.115
(0.185)

0.00287
(0.192)

-0.0932
(0.182)

-0.0570
(0.182)

-0.137
(0.182)

0.0117
(0.203)

490
0.164
Yes
Yes
0.363

490
0.161
Yes
Yes
0.363

490
0.161
Yes
Yes
0.363

490
0.160
Yes
Yes
0.363

490
0.163
Yes
Yes
0.363

490
0.172
Yes
Yes
0.363

490
0.164
Yes
Yes
0.363

490
0.167
Yes
Yes
0.363

490
0.162
Yes
Yes
0.363

490
0.191
Yes
Yes
0.363

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include the set of controls as in table 3 and neighborhoods fixed effects.
The mean dependent variable refers to the take-up rate of the group which received on the spot sale and no information.
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Table 5. Rates of purchase across income quintiles for both the voucher and on-the-spot sale.
on-the-spot sale

voucher

combined

n

mean

SE

n

mean

SE

P-value

n

mean

SE

income quintile 1

50

0.32

0.067

44

0.41

0.075

0.38

94

0.36

0.05

income quintile 2

52

0.35

0.067

48

0.67

0.069

0.001

100

0.5

0.05

income quintile 3

53

0.32

0.065

45

0.58

0.074

0.01

98

0.44

0.05

income quintile 4

76

0.41

0.057

58

0.66

0.063

0.004

134

0.51

0.043

income quintile 5
30 0.23 0.079 34 0.44 0.086
0.08
64
0.34
0.06
Notes: n is the sample size for each subsample; P-value is shown for a two-sided test of equality between the voucher and on-the-spot means.
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